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ARTICLES
A THREE PRONG APPROACH TO
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE SYNDROME
Although courts generally disallow witnesses to state their
"opinion,"I an important exception has developed in the area of
I E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 1I at 26 (3d ed. 1984). At common law, the
term opinion implied the formulation of an idea without an adequate foundation for sup-
port. Id. In the mid-eighteenth century, Lord Mansfield opined that " 'It is mere opinion,
which is not evidence'." Id. at n.7. This statement has been interpreted as a criticism of
opinion testimony which lacks the element of personal knowledge. Id. § 11 at 26.
In contemporary American usage, the definition of opinion includes any belief, infer-
ence, or conclusion regardless of whether it has developed as a result of personal exposure
to a particular set of circumstances. Id. The authors adopt this definition for use in this
article.
A peculiar result of the American application of the rule is the exclusion of inferences
drawn by witnesses possessing personal knowledge. d. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE COMMENTARY ON RuLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES § 701[011 (1987). The English courts excluded statements of belief not
based on personal knowledge, while American courts extended this notion to exclude in-
ferences irrespective of whether they were based on personal knowledge. Id. See also 7 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW, § 1917 at 8 (1940) (this exclusion of inferences drawn by witnesses has failed to occur
in substantial degree in England). According to Dean Wigmore's interpretation of histori-
cal evidence, such inferences were not excluded until the eighteen hundreds. 7 J. WIG-
MORE, supra, § 1917 at 1-10. The court in Donnell v. Jones, 13 Ala. 490 (1848) stated that
the general rule requires witnesses to testify only to those facts within the realm of their
personal knowledge. Id. at 511. It explicitly rejected the idea that deductions by witnesses
based upon facts are a proper form of evidence, since such deductions invaded the prov-
ince of the jury. Id. See Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Schultz, 43 Ohio 270, 283, 1 N.E. 324,
332 (1885). The court in Baltimore stated: "[WJitnesses should have been restricted in their
testimony to the facts, and the jury left free to form an opinion upon them ...." Id. In
fact, Dean Wigmore's major criticism of the opinion rule pertains to the scientific impossi-
bility of distinguishing between statements which represent fact and those which represent
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expert testimony. The general rule regarding the admissibility of
opinion testimony provided by an expert dictates that whenever
the expert's knowledge concerning the issue exceeds that of the
jury and assists them in reaching a final determination, then such
evidence should be admitted.'
opinion. 7 J. WIGMOitu, supra, § 1919 at 14. See 3 J. WEINSrEIN & M. BERGER, supra, at §
701(01]. It is impossible to make a clear distinction between fact and opinion. Id.
I Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 416 (1952). Such a departure from the
general rule is warranted in only two instances. Id. The first involves a scenario in which a
non-expert witness is incapable of detailing the pertinent facts in the manner necessary to
provide the jury with a clear image of the witness' observation. Id. As the court noted in
Grismore v. Consol. Prod. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942), it is sometimes im-
practical to require the witness to recall and state all the minute details embodying her
observation. Id. at 344, 5 N.W.2d at 655. Under these limited circumstances the non-ex-
pert witness will be permitted to resort to opinion in describing her observations. Id. The
second instance triggering admissibility of opinion testimony occurs when testimony is be-
ing elicited from an expert witness. Ladd, supra, at 416. See E. CLEARY, supra note 1. § 14
at 35-38.
SGrimore, 232 Iowa at 344, 5 N.W.2d at 654-64. The court in Grismore recognized that
the acceptance of opinion evidence, irrespective of its source, is a matter residing solely
within the discretion of the court. Id. at 342, 5 N.W.2d at 654. The Grismore court exer-
cised its discretion and permitted the introduction of the proffered evidence stating that
the "witness... was better qualified to answer the question than the ordinary juror." Id.
Under the traditional view, an expert is permitted to state an opinion when "the issue to
which the testimony would be directed is 'not within the common knowledge of the aver-
age layman."' 3 J. WENsrEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 702[02) at 702-8 n.l (quoting
Bridger v. Union Ry. Co., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966)). Such opinion must be based
upon personal knowledge of the facts, facts stated in the record, or a combination of both
factors. E. CLEARv, supra note I, § 14 at 35. If the opinion is premised upon facts recited in
the record, then the witness is required to have been present when the testimony pertain-
ing to the relevant facts was delivered. Id. Alternatively, if she was not present at the rele-
vant time, then the facts may be provided to the witness in the form of a hypothetical
question that requires her to assume the veracity of the facts and state an opinion based on
such an assumption. Id. The danger arises when the attorney, seeking to circumvent the
lengthy process which is involved in formulating a hypothetical question, simply asks that
the expert state her opinion on the basis of testimony previously presented to the court.
Note, Expert Testimony As An "Invasion of the Province of TheJury", 26 IOWA L. REV. 819, 821
(1941).
Under the modern Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert is permitted to state an opinion
where her "knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue." FED. R. EvID. 702. This is true regardless of whether the subject
matter resides within the common understanding of the average individual juror. 3 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 7021021 at 702-09 - 702-10. Furthermore, Rule
703 provides:
[Tihe facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hear-
ing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 703.
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One of the dangers, however, is that the expert's opinion will
"invade the province of the jury."4 Traditionally, the jury's prov-
ince includes evaluation of the credibility of witnesses' and the
resolution of the ultimate facts in issue. If the court decides that
the witness is being asked to weigh conflicting testimony and de-
termine the credibility of a party or other witness, the testimony
may be prohibited. Similarly, the common law Ultimate Fact
Doctrine prohibits the use of testimony expressed in the form of
an opinion based upon an ultimate fact in issue.8
' See Note, supra note 3, at 821; 3 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE § 1321 at 2417-18
(2d ed. 1926). This phrase, alternately referred to as "usurping the function of the jury", is
used as justification for refusing to admit into evidence certain types of testimony which, it
is believed, will cause the jury to yield too readily to opinions elicited from expert wit-
nesses. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1920 at 17. See E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 12 at 30. A
witness's statement indicating his belief with respect to the outcome of the case, if admit-
ted, "would tend to suggest that the judge and the jury may shift responsibility for decision
to the witnesses .... " Id.
5 See Note, supra note 3, at 820. See also E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 12 at 30 (responsibil
ity for decisions resides with the jury, not the witness); 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1920
at 17 (quoting Chief Justice Nelson in Lincoln v. Ry. Co., 23 Wend. 432 (N.Y. 1840))
(" 'When ... the judgment, belief, and inferences of a witness are inquired into as matters
proper for the consideration of a jury ... the judgment of witnesses is substituted for that
of the jury' ").
' See Note, supra note 3, at 820. See also K CLEARY, supra note I, § 12 at 30 n.3 (a
witness could not offer his opinion or conclusion on an ultimate fact in issue); 7 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 1, § 1921, at 18 (quoting Justice Elliott in Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464,
471 (1883)) (" 'It is a general rule that a witness cannot be allowed to express an opinion
upon the exact question which the jury are required to decide' ").
7 See Note, supra note 3, at 821. See also United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th
Cir. 1986) (a pediatrician's opinion as to believability of child's story of sexual abuse in-
vaded jury's domain); United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir.) (quoting
United States v. Ward, 169 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1948)) (impermissible for expert to
"'weigh the evidence and determine credibility"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981); United
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) (the jury, as a "lie detector", deter-
mines credibility), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084,
1087-88, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (Sup. Ct. Crim. Term Kings County 1984) (court permit-
ted expert witness to explain rape trauma syndrome to jury and express her opinion that
victim suffers from that syndrome; jury's responsibility to assess the credibility of the vic-
tim's testimony). Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 443, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (1986) (the
task of determining a witness' credibility has been traditionally delegated to jury). But see
State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 608-10, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338-39 (1982) (court allowed expert
to testify that "he 'found her (child victim's) story believable' "); State v. Marks, 231 Kan.
645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1298-99 (1982) (court allowed expert testimony that victim suf-
fered from rape trauma syndrome); State v. Geyman, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (Mont. 1986) (a
comment from expert witnesses bearing upon credibility of a child does not invade the
province of jury).
' See Note, supra note 3, at 825. Although a precise definition of an "ultimate fact" has
eluded scholars, the phrase is used to convey the idea of a "fact the establishment of which
is one of the issues in the case and which when decided leaves nothing more for the jury to
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This article addresses one of the most delicate issues of expert
testimony to confront courts today': whether experts should be
determine with regard to that issue." Id.
A tendency towards a more liberal approach with respect to the admissibility of expert
opinions based upon ultimate facts in issue appears to have begun with the Grismore v.
Consol. Prod. case. 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942). In Grismore, a poultry farmer
sued to recover damages for the death and injury to turkeys caused by feeding them a
product prepared by the defendant in accordance with instructions provided by defend-
ant's agent. Id. at 334, 5 N.W.2d at 650. A witness who was experienced in raising turkeys
was asked to state his opinion based upon a hypothetical question as to the cause of their
death and injury. Id. at 340-41, 5 N.W.2d at 654. An objection was raised on the grounds
that the admission of the opinion of the witness invaded the province of the jury. Id. at
341, 5 N.W.2d at 654. In contemplating a ruling on the objection, the court recognized
the "complexity of modern life" and the need to mold the rules to satisfy the changing
needs of society. Id. at 343, 5 N.W.2d at 655. Although it reiterated the rule that receipt
of opinion evidence lies within the discretion of the court, it observed that "Ifior too many
years too many courts have so frowned upon expert opinion testimony and have so re-
stricted its admission and consideration that the triers of facts have been denied aid that
was essential to a proper determination of litigated causes." Id. Accordingly, the court fol-
lowed "the modern tendency ... to take a more liberal and rational view ", and permitted
the witness to testify as to her opinion. Id. See E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 12 at 30 n.7.
This liberalization of the law resulted in the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 704.
E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 12 at 30-31. Rule 704 reads as follows: "Testimony in the form
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Id. This rule effectively abolishes the
ultimate issue doctrine. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 704 at 704-3 - 704-4.
Currently, a majority of state courts allow into evidence expert opinions based upon ulti-
mate facts in issue. E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 12 at 30 n.8.
When considering the application of Rule 704, courts will simultaneously consider Rules
403 and 702. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note I, § 704 at 704-4. Rule 403 permits
the introduction of relevant material while Rule 702 requires that the expert's opinion
*1assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." See FED.
R. EVID. 403, 702. The interplay among these rules "afford(s) ample assurances against the
admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach." 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 704 at 704-4. See DiBella v. State, 574 F. Supp. 151,
152 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff d, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985). In DiBella, a civil rights action was
brought against police officers alleging that they did not have reasonable cause to believe
that plaintiff was engaged in illegal bookmaking. Id. The court held inadmissible expert
testimony as to the factors suggesting the existence of probable cause for arrest in book-
making activities since such testimony would only give the jury an opinion as to how the
case should be decided. Id. at 154.
' See Slicker, Child Sexual Abuse: The Innocent Accused, 91 CASE & COM. 12 (1986). "Until
the 1950's child abuse was unrecognized or ignored. With respect to sexual abuse the pre-
vailing view was that it was the product of the child's fantasy." Id. Historically, this view
makes sense in light of the fact that children were viewed as unreliable witnesses. Id. See
generally Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections On Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony, and Recan-
tation, 20 VAL UL. REV. 145, 161-71 (1986) (child's competence had to be established in
every case).
Recently, however, heightened public awareness of the frequency with which children
are victims of abuse has neccessitated a reevaluation of the traditional view. See Notes, The
Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO.
L.J. 429, 429-30 n.3 (1985). See also McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Corn-
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permitted to give opinion testimony as to the credibility1" of sexu-
ally abused children" in criminal trials against the children's al-
leged assailants. A recurring area of concern for the courts is that
a defendant's constitutional right to have a jury determine the
facts in issue, which includes determining the credibility of a wit-
ness, is not violated by the admission of expert testimony as to
such credibility.1 While a body of case law dealing with this issue
has begun to amass, no uniform theory exists among the various
jurisdictions.
plaints In Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray Into The Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evi-
dence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1986) (author estimates using "conservative
figures" that two percent of all boys and ten percent of all girls are victims of sexual abuse,
amounting to 210,000 new cases of child sexual abuse every year); Notes, supra, at 430 n.4
(quoting a number of recent articles and surveys on incidents of child sexual abuse).
10 See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979): United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 200 F.2d 666
(2d Cir. 1952). Typically the credibility of a victim is intertwined with the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant. Both matters, credibility of a witness and the determination of
guilt or innocence of the accused, are reserved solely for the fact finder. United States v.
Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). Most juris-
dictions hold that it is improper to express an opinion as to whether another witness is
telling the truth. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 412, 417-18, 199 A.2d 709,
713 (1964) (impermissible for doctor to opine as to the reliability of lay witness's opinion
regarding defendant's sobriety); Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass. 680, 682, 403 N.E.2d
1191, 1193 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (doctor's opinion that mildly retarded individual was
telling the truth held inadmissible), affd, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981); Beishir v.
State, 522 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo.) (expert testimony that witness is not truthful held inad-
missible), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); State v. Williams, 34 N.C. App. 408, 414, 238
S.E.2d 668, 672 (1977) (psychiatrist's opinion that he considered defendant reliable prop-
erly excludable), appeal dismissed, 293 N.C. 743, 241 S.E.2d 72, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906
(1978); State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1255 (R.I. 1981) (issue of whether defendant is
lying, is within the "exclusive province of the jury"). But see United States v. Smith, 736
F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir.) (questioning whether expert opinion on eyewitness credibility
invaded the province of the jury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984); United States v. Hiss,
88 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y.) (psychiatrist's opinion as to the sanity of witness admissible
to impeach credibility), aff d, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951);
People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 431, 224 N.W. 387, 388 (1929) (expert testimony admis-
sible to show sexual conduct of a rape victim).
" See Notes, supra note 9, at 429 n.1 (quoting the National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect which defines child sexual abuse as "contacts or interactions between a child and
adult when the child is being used as an object of gratification for adult sexual needs or
desires"). But see McCord, supra note 9, at nn.31-42 and accompanying text (no consensus
as to the definition on child sexual abuse).
" See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 3 ("[Tlhe trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury
."). See also Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims be
Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv.
115, 118 (1985) (ignoring importance of procedural guarantees to protect the accuser
"may hinder the search for truth and lessen the accuracy of fact-finding").
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I. THREE APPROACHES
Generally, the courts take one of three approaches.13 First,
some courts follow a moderate approach. Jurisdictions that adhere
to this view allow an expert to give an opinion on characteristics
observed in sexually abused children but hold that an expert may
not give testimony that a jury may construe as an opinion about
the credibility of a child.14 Other courts take a liberal stand and
hold that expert testimony on both typical characteristics of sexu-
ally abused children and on the believability of the child complain-
See Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97 (1985).
Several jurisdictions, however, have avoided addressing the issue. For instance, in State v.
Colgan, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) the court stated that it was inappropriate for
it to decide the admissibility of testimony of a family therapist that the victim's account of
sexual abuse by defendant was credible. Id. at 534. The court in upholding the defendant's
conviction simply stated that even if the expert testimony was improperly admitted it did
not constitute reversible error. d. In State v. Snapp, 110 Idaho 269, 273, 715 P.2d 939,
943 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court refused to pass judgment on the admissibility of
expert testimony where "the guilt of a defendant is sought to be established by testimony
which describes the 'child sexual abuse syndrome', finds typical characteristics of such syn-
drome in the alleged victim, and thus suggests that the victim indeed has been sexually
abused." Id. at 273, 715 P.2d at 943. In this case, the defendant was convicted through
testimony of the victims (his children) without any reliance on the testimony of an expert
being necessary for the conviction. Id.
14 See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Lind-
sey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692
S.W.2d 769 (1985). People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 395 N.W.2d 274 (1986); State
v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); Smith v. Nevada, 100 Nev. 570, 688 P.2d 326
(1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State v. Pettit, 66 Or. App.
575, 675 P.2d 183 (1984); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984); State
v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
There has only been one federal case on this issue to date. United States v. Azure, 801
F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986). Federal jurisdiction was proper since the federal government has
jurisdiction over the crime of carnal knowledge committed by an Indian within Indian
country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1984).
Azure involved an allegation that the defendant sexually abused the eleven year old
daughter of his common law wife. 801 F.2d at 337-38. At trial a pediatrician who was an
expert on child sexual abuse was allowed to testify that "he could see no reason why [the
child] would not be telling the truth in this matter." Id. at 339.
In reversing, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the testimony invaded the
province of the jury. Id. at 340-41. Though the court conceded that the area of child
sexual abuse demanded special attention, it feared the jury may have relied on the expert's
opinion and "surrendered their own common sense in weighing the testimony." Id. at 340
(quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
959 (1974)).
The court acknowledged in dictum, however, that the expert could have assisted the jury
without invading its province by testifying generally on the characteristics of victims of
child sexual abuse as compared to the child's story. Id.
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ant is admissible. 5 Finally, at least one jurisdiction has indicated it
would disallow both opinion as to the credibility of the child as
well as background information."6 This view has been termed the
conservative approach.
A. The Moderate View
In State v. Middleton,'17 the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a
lower court decision allowing a juvenile counselor and a social
worker to explain that the particular victim's behavior was typical
of sexually abused children. 8 The state questioned these witnesses
in order to elicit testimony which would provide a counter argu-
ment to the defendant's allegation that the child's account of
abuse was a fabrication.1 9 The juvenile counselor testified that she
found the child's behavior much in keeping with children who
complained of sexual molestation. 0 The social worker stated that
incidents of guilt, anxiety, running away, delayed reporting of the
occurrence, and retracting accusations are characteristics of sexu-
ally abused children.'1 This testimony has become known as "pro-
file" or "syndrome" evidence."
The court reasoned that if a qualified expert offers testimony
on whether the reactions of the child in the case at hand are simi-
lar to that of other children who have been sexually abused, then
the testimony would help the jury to understand 3 the psychologi-
" See State v. Butler, 178 Ga. App. 110, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986); State v. Kim, 64 Haw.
598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982); State v. Geyman, 729 P.2d 475 (Mont. 1986).
" Tennessee v. Curtis, No. 114, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 1981).
1? 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
' Id. at 438, 657 P.2d at 1221.
" Id. at 429-30, 657 P.2d at 1216.
20 Id. at 432 n.5, 657 P.2d at 1218 n.5.
I d. at 433-34 n.6, 657 P.2d at 1218-19 n.6.
Wells, Expert Testimony: To Admit or Not to Admit, 57 FLA. B.J. 673 (1983). A syndrome
is characterized by a cluster of signs and symptoms which occur simultaneously thereby
indicating a specific abnormality. Id.
3 Middleton, 294 Or. at 435-36, 657 P.2d at 1220. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota
stated in State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984):
The nature ...of sexual abuse of children places lay jurors at a disadvantage.
Incest is prohibited in all or almost all cultures, and the common experience of the
jury may represent a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility of a
young child who complains of sexual abuse.
Id. at 610. As Justice Roberts said in a concurring opinion in Middleton: "[While jurors
may be capable of personalizing the emotions of victims of [other crimes] and of assessing
Vol. 2: 140, 1987
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cal aftermath occasioned by sexual abuse.24 However, the court
specifically stated that this holding would not "open the door
widely." ' An expert witness could not give an opinion on
whether she believes the victim is telling the truth. 6
witness credibility accordingly, tensions unique to the trauma [of sexual abuse] . . . have
remained largely unknown to the public." Middleton, 294 Or. at 440, 657 P.2d at 1222
(Roberts, J., concurring).
U Id. at 436, 657 P.2d at 1219-20. As Justice Coyne states in State v. Myers:
In the case of a sexually abused child consent is irrelevant and jurors are often
faced with determining the veracity of a young child who tells of a course of conduct
carried over an ill defined time frame and who appears an uncertain or ambivalent
accuser and who may even recant. Background data providing a relevant insight into
the puzzling aspects of a child's conduct and demeanor which the jury could not
otherwise bring to its evaluation of her credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases
of sexual abuse of children ....
Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 610. In sum, the expert adds an "indicia of reliability" to the facts
and brings consistency to a situation where there is inconsistency. Middleton, 294 Or. at
440, 657 P.2d at 1222 (Roberts, J., concurring). See also People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App.
171, 178, 395 N.W.2d 274, 277 (1986) (rape counselor permitted to testify on whether it
was typical for children to delay reporting the abuse or change their minds); Smith v. Ne-
vada, 100 Nev. 570, 572, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (1984) (expert permitted to explain the rea-
sons for delays in reporting by sex abuse victim); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa.
Super. 368, 373-74, 502 A.2d 253, 254 (1985) (testimony of social worker explaining dy-
namics of child sexual abuse is admissible due to the distinctive nature of the crime and the
effects on complainants); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576, 683 P.2d 173, 180
(1984) (expert permitted to testify that a delay in reporting was found in fifty percent of
sexual abuse cases); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 94, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1984) (psychiatric testimony held admissible for explaining instances of recantation).
In Middleton, the court rejected the defendant's argument that such testimony invades
the province of the jury: [lI]t is impossible to usurp the jury's function. Even if there is
uncontradicted expert testimony, the jury is not bound by it .... " Middleton, 294 Or. at
435, 657 P.2d at 1219. While it is true that if thejury believed the expert they would also
likely believe the victim, here neither expert testified directly as to the truth of the victim's
account. Id. "Much expert testimony will tend to show that another witness either is or is
not telling the truth (citation omitted). This, by itself, will not render evidence inadmissi-
ble." Id. "[T]he test is whether expert's testimony, if believed will be of help . . . to the
jury." Id. (quoting State v. Stringer, 292 Or. 388, 391, 639 P.2d 1264, (1982)). Wigmore
has suggested that the notion of jury usurpation is so misleading it ought to be repudiated.
7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1920 at 17.
" Middleton, 294 Or. at 438, 657 P.2d at 1221.
I d. See also State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 373, 380, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986) (expert testimony that victim was telling the truth about molestation was held preju-
dicial and inadmissible); People v. Matlock, 153 Mich. App. 171, 177, 395 N.W.2d 274,
277 (1986) (rape counselor's testimony that none of her patients ever lied amounted to an
impermissible vouching for the complainant's credibility); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d
92, 95, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (opinion of psychiatrist that defendant's
daughter was victim of incest was equivalent to saying that the victim told the truth: such
testimony held inadmissible).
147
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B. The Liberal View
Some jurisdictions permit the expert to comment both directly
on the credibility of the child victim as well as offer syndrome evi-
dence. 17 The seminal case adhering to this approach is State v.
Kim.28
In Kim, the defendant was accused of raping his thirteen year
old step-daughter.2 At the trial, the state called a pediatrician
who had examined the child one week after the incident.30 The
pediatrician testified as to the general characteristics of a sexually
abused child and that the complainant shared several of these
characteristics." Then, the doctor concluded that her account was
believable.3 2 Guided by the liberal approach to admissibility of ex-
pert testimony in the Hawaii Rules of Evidence,3 3 the court al-
lowed the pediatrician's testimony since it helped the jury to assess
the victim's credibility." The court stressed that the doctor's testi-
mony was not a "naked conclusion ' 3 5 on his part, but in fact of-
fered the jury some factual basis from which to assess the founda-
tion of the doctor's opinion.3 e It was considered unnecessary "to
establish specific fixed requirements to deal with such
testimony." 87
'7 See supra note 15.
" State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
' Id. at 599, 645 P.2d at 1332-33.
o d. at 599-600, 645 P.2d at 1333.
* Id. at 600-01, 645 P.2d at 1334.
" Id. at 601, 645 P.2d at 1334.
" Id. at 603-04, 645 P.2d at 1335. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626 (1985).
" See Kim, 64 Haw. at 602, 645 P.2d at 1335 (quoting Goldstein, Credibility and Incredi-
bility: The Psychiatric Examination of the Complaining Witness, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1238,
1240 (1980)). The Kim court found that: "[T]he purpose underlying the testimony of an
expert is not to substitute his or her estimation of credibility for that of the jury. Rather, it
is to provide a scientific perspective for the jury according to which it can evaluate the
complainant's testimony for itself." Id. at 602-04, 645 P.2d at 1334-35.
3 See id. at 608, 645 P.2d at 1338. Chief Justice Richardson stated that in order to assist
the jury an expert "must base his testimony upon a sound factual foundation; any infer-
ences or opinions must be the product of an explicable and reliable system of analysis; and
such opinions must add to the common understanding of the jury." Id.
" Id. The court found the physician's testimony not "so inherently lacking in usefulness
... that permitting its use constituted an abuse of discretion." Id.
27 Id. at 603, 645 P.2d at 1335.
Several states have decided to let an expert testify as to the believability of the victim on
the ground that the jury does not possess the knowledge to evaluate these matters. See, e.g.,
State v. Geyman, 729 P.2d 475, 478 (Mont. 1986). The court here held testimony as to the
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C. The Conservative View
In Tennessee v. Curtis," the Court of Criminal Appeals of Ten-
nessee ruled that an expert could not give testimony that young
children knew the distinctions between right and wrong or were
more credible than adults or older children. 9 While only dealing
with expert testimony as to child complainants in general terms,'0
the court harkened back to a time when it was believed that chil-
dren were subject to "flights of fantasy.""
credibility of a child's allegations to be admissible, as long as the jury remained free to
accept or reject an expert's opinion. Id. at 480. In fact, such testimony enlightens the ju-
rors on matters unfamiliar to them. Id. at 479-80. See State v. Butler, 178 Ga. App. 110,
111, 349 S.E.2d 684, 685-86 (1986). In Butler, a pediatrician testified that children of a
certain age who are able to distinguish between truth and falsity cannot lie about anything
they do not have knowledge of. Id. at 111, 349 S.E.2d at 685. The court held this testi-
mony to be admissible because the pediatrician's opinion was one which the jury would not
normally be able to draw for themselves. Id.
" No. 114, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 1981).
" Id. at 13-14.
,0 Id. at 14. Curtis involved a four year old girl who witnessed a neighbor kill her
mother. Id.
" Id. See Roe, supra note IS, at 105. The authors are in agreement with Roe who be-
lieves that Tennessee's approach in Curtis would be devastating to the prosecution of child
sexual abuse cases:
The implication that the victim imagined or fantasized the sexual abuse is an un-
dercurrent in every case involving very young children. Expert witnesses are needed
in this area not to render opinions as to whether a child is telling the truth but to
generally describe the principles of the emotional development of children and to
counter the implicit defense of fabrication or imagination.
Id.
While the authors have focused on the three major views, the views of several jurisdic-
tions fail to conform. See State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986). In Myers, the court
held inadmissible the testimony of a child abuse investigator and a high school principal
that children generally tell the truth when they report they have been sexually abused. Id.
at 92-93, 97-98. See also State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985). In Logue, the court
held inadmissible a social worker's opinion that the alleged victim gained his sexual knowl-
edge from having sex with the appellant because the matter here was not so complex as to
be beyond the jury's understanding. Id. at 157-58. Neither case, however, elaborated on
whether syndrome evidence was admissible.
Both California and New York rank high among states in reported incidences of child
sexual abuse. See Notes, supra note 9, at 430 n.4. To date, however, the high court of both
these jurisdictions have yet to give a definitive answer as to the extent of expert testimony
in child sexual abuse cases. A number of lower court decisions do exist on this issue.
From these cases, it is submitted that New York is headed towards a liberal approach.
For instance, several courts have approved the use of expert testimony to corroborate the
otherwise unverifiable acts of sexual abuse of children. See, e.g., Matter of Michael G., 129
Misc. 2d 186, 191, 492 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997 (Family Ct. Westchester County 1985); Dutchess
County Dep't of Social Services v. Bertha C., 130 Misc. 2d 1043, 1046-47, 498 N.Y.S.2d
960, 962-63 (Family Ct. Dutchess County 1986). Other courts have determined that it is
proper for the jury to consider expert testimony which had been based upon observation
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II. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES
Given the difficulties in prosecuting a child sexual abuse case, 2
it is submitted that the admission of expert testimony is war-
ranted. Using the Federal Rules of Evidence as the key to provid-
ing uniformity among the various jurisdictions, it is submitted that
the following guidelines should be implemented by the courts: (a)
the expert should be permitted to testify as to whether or not the
alleged victim possesses characteristics similar to those exhibited
by actual victims of child sexual abuse, that is, syndrome evidence;
of reactions and sexual acting out of the subject child. See Matter of Tara H., 129 Misc. 2d
508, 514-16, 494 N.Y.S.2d 953, 959-60 (Family Ct. Westchester County 1985). Among the
various factors considered significant in Tara H. was the child's extensive and detailed
knowledge of and preoccupation with sexual matters to a degree far beyond a normal indi-
vidual of her age. Id.
In People v. Benjamin R., 103 App. Div. 2d 663, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1984), an
expert was permitted to explain why a victim is often reluctant to reveal the crime, particu-
larly when the acts are committed in a family setting. Id. at 669, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 831-32.
The court found such testimony admissible for a number of reasons: (1) crimes involving
sexual abuse are complex because they often involve young victims unable to articulate the
details of the act; (2) the average juror does not have the general awareness of a child's
reaction to sexual abuse and hence expert testimony assists the juror in determining what
effect to give the child's allegation; (3) the defense counsel is free to impeach the expert or
offer a different opinion through his qualified witnesses. Id. at 668-70, 481 N.Y.S.2d at
831-32.
In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984), a California court
allowed an expert who had examined the victim to testify that the victim had been sexually
abused, but forbade the expert to testify that the victim's father was the abuser. Id. at
1115-18, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799-801. As to the testimony on whether the child had been
sexually abused, the court reasoned that evidence of sexual abuse was a matter beyond
common experience, and a non-expert observing the same behavior as an expert would
have difficulty interpreting the data. Id. at 1118, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 801. However, when the
expert testified that the victim's father was the perpetrator, such testimony amounted to
hearsay. Id. at 1118-20, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02. The court would have allowed opinion
based on hearsay so long as it was confined to aspects of the patient's mental state and not
as the basis for opinion about the conduct of the third party. Id. at 1119, 200 Cal. Rptr. at
801-02. See also People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804
(1984) (testimony of two police officers qualified as experts in the field of child molestation,
that it was difficult for a child victim of molestation to talk about the incident, was admissi-
ble because subject was not within common experience of jury). But see People v. Bledsoe,
36 Cal.3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984) (expert testimony
as to rape trauma syndrome held inadmissible to prove that a rape had occurred); People v.
Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (1986) (psychologist's testi-
mony concluding that complainant was victim of molestation held inadmissible, although
expert could have relied on various studies without relying on a detailed analysis of the
facts at hand).
" See Notes, supra note 9, at 431 n.20. The various reasons for these difficulties include
no direct evidence- either eyewitness, physical, or medical; belief that adults do not commit
such acts; no testimony of the child victim; inconsistent behavior by the complainant. Id.
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(b) appropriate jury instructions should be given to reinforce the
fact that the jury is not required to believe any or all of the ex-
pert's testimony, and that they are the sole judge of the child's
credibility; (c) an expert in the field of child sexual abuse should
be agreed upon by both parties, or in the event no agreement can
be reached, one should be appointed by the court.
A. Acceptable Contents of Expert Testimony
A basic tenet in both case law and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is that absent an attack on credibility no bolstering evidence
is allowed." The issue addressed in this article is not simply a mat-
ter of rehabilitating a child once she has been impeached."' The
focus here is on the extent that basic principles of evidence law
will permit an expert to help the fact finder draw conclusions
about the child's allegations of sexual abuse. Syndrome evidence
4S See FED. R. EviD. 608(a)(2). Under 608(a), the credibility of any witness may be at-
tacked by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation testimony as to the character of
the witness for truthfulness. FED. R. EviD. 608(a). If a witness's character for truthfulness
has been attacked then it likewise may be supported by an opinion for reputation for truth-
fulness. FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(2). See also M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
608.3 (1986) (a character witness testifying in the.form of an opinion may be asked
whether or not he would believe the witness under oath); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 1, § 608[041 at 608-25 ("witnesses may now be asked directly to state [their]
opinion of the principal witness's character for truthfulness and [they) may answer, for
example, 'I think X is a liar.' ").
Thus, the admissibility of evidence in the form of an opinion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 608(a) removes an obstacle to the use of testimony, expert or otherwise, concern-
ing the veracity of a witness. In State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984), the
expert was permitted to testify that he believed the victim's allegations were truthful. Id.
However, the court was quick to point out that as a general rule it would reject expert
opinion regarding the truth of witness' allegations because it would "lend an unwarranted
single 'stamp' of scientific legitimacy to the allegations" (citation omitted). Id. The court
reasoned however, that once the defense discredited the child's credibility by showing the
child's mother (the "ultimate expert" on a child's credibility) did not believe her, it thereby
waived any objection to bolstering opinion, testimony even though it was given by an ex-
pert. Id. at 611-12.
44 See State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 574, 683 P.2d 173, 179 (1984). "The rules
relating to character evidence are not pertinent here." Id. Here a shadow is cast on the
victim's credibility because of her conduct. Even if this evidence properly cast doubt on her
credibility, "it did not attack her character for truthfulness." Id. In other words, expert
testimony enhancing the credibility of the complainant child is not to be likened to expert
testimony vouching for the complainant's credibility. See, e.g., People v. Grady, 133 Misc.
2d 211, 213, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1986) ("evidence [of child
sexual abuse syndromel is not admissible to bolster the testimony of a young victim, but
rather to understand the psychological aftermath occasioned by the trauma. ... ).
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offered by an expert in child sexual abuse cases has its purpose in
explaining the behavior of the complainant which on its face ap-
pears to be unusual. Although such testimony may ultimately af-
fect the jury's assessment of credibility, the testimony by the ex-
pert is not a direct opinion on whether or not the child is telling
the truth."
It is apparent that the legal community is currently divided over
the admissibility of all types of syndrome evidence.' In United
46 See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984). Much expert testimony tends
to indirectly bolster the complainant's credibility but that alone does not render it inadmis-
sible. Id. The key is if it will help the jury. Id. See also State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427,
435, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1983) ("[l1t is true that if the jurors believed the experts' testi-
mony, they would be more likely to believe victim's account .... Much expert testimony
will tend to show that another witness either is or is not telling the truth"); Roe, supra note
9, at 108-11 (favors admitting expert testimony of syndrome evidence to assist the jury).
46 See Wells, supra note 22, at 673. Child sexual abuse syndrome is only one type of
syndrome which attorneys frequently attempt to introduce into evidence. Id. Others in-
clude battered spouse syndrome, battered child syndrome, post traumatic stress syndrome,
and rape trauma syndrome. Id.
Battered spouse syndrome is characterized by a pattern of severe physical and psycholog-
ical abuse which is inflicted upon a spouse by another spouse over a substantial period of
time. Notes, supra note 9, at 450 n. 135. Typically, the female spouse finds herself in a
situation where she subjectively believes that her life is being threatened. Id. She responds
by killing the spouse and then pleading self-defense to the crime that she has perpetrated.
Id. Evidence of this syndrome can be relevant to explain to the trier of fact the woman's
state of mind and subsequent conduct. Id. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626,
633-35 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Ibn-Tamas court held that the trial court's decision to exclude
expert testimony on the "battered women" syndrome on the basis that such testimony in-
vaded the jury's province was error as a matter of law. Id. at 635. But see State v. Thomas,
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981) (the trial court's refusal to
admit expert testimony on "battered wife syndrome" not reversible error).
Battered child syndrome is characterized by several specific symptoms which are primar-
ily physical in nature. See Notes, supra note 9, at 448-49. See State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C.
559, 569, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978). The Wilkerson court held admissible expert medical
opinion on "battered child" syndrome. Id, See also State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513,
516, 629 P.2d 462, 463 (1981) (the trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing
expert testimony on "battered child syndrome").
Battering parent syndrome refers to a profile of characteristics typically shared by par-
ents who are prone to abusing their offspring. Annotation, Admissibility at Criminal Prosecu-
tion Of Expert Testimony On Battering Parent Syndrome, 43 A.L.R. 4th 1203, 1204 (1986). See
State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172-73 (Me. 1984). Reversible error was committed
when the trial judge excluded expert testimony on battering parent syndrome. Id. But see
State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983) (reversible error to admit
expert testimony identifying defendant "as a member of a group having a higher incidence
of child sexual abuse").
Rape trauma syndrome is defined as " 'the acute phase and long-term reorganization
process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape'." Massaro, Ex-
perts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 425 n.127 (1985) (quoting
Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, THE RAPE VIcrIM, at 121). See State v.
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States v. Amaral,"7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit es-
tablished a four prong test which operates as a guide to the admis-
sion of various forms of expert testimony.48 First, the witness must
be qualified as an expert by the court.49 Second, the court must
determine whether the expert testimony will aid the jurors in un-
derstanding matters not within their common experiences."
Third, the theory upon which the expert testimony is based must
be one that is generally accepted by the relevant scientific commu-
nity. It must, therefore, satisfy the Frye standard."' However, sub-
sequent to the Amaral decision, the Federal Rules of Evidence
were adopted [hereinafter Federal Rules].52 Federal Rule 702
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 655, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (1982). The Marks court refused to
find that the trial judge abused his discretion by permitting expert testimony as to the
existence of rape trauma syndrome. Id. But see State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230
(Minn. 1982) (erroneous to admit expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome).
Cases dealing with child sexual abuse syndrome are typically separated into two separate
categories. See Wells, supra note 22, at 673. Qne category includes victims of child rape. Id.
This type of crime is characterized by a violent attack on the victim, sometimes resulting in
death. Id. The other category of abuse includes children who have been sexually victimized
over a period of time. Id. Statistically, the greatest number of these latter type of cases
involve family members as perpetrators, for example, stepfathers, mothers' boyfriends. Id.
This type of abuse, known as intrafamilial sexual abuse, refers to "any contacts or interac-
tions between a child and [other family members in a position of power or control over the
child, where] the child is being used for the sexual stimulation of the perpetrator or an-
other person." 1. SLOAN, PROTECTION OF ABUSED VICTIMS: STATE LAWS & DECISIONS: OVERALL
TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 6 (1982). Some indicators of sexual abuse include "diffi-
culty in walking or sitting; torn, stained, or bloody underclothing; complaints of pain or
itching in genital area: veneral disease ... [and the] display [of] bizarre sexual knowledge."
Id. at 6-7.
47 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 1152-53.
" Id. at 1153. See Ellis v. K-Lan Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1983); Grindstaff
v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 740, 742-43 (11th Cir. 1982). See also FED. R EviD. 702 ("a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise"),
'o Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152-53. See FED. R. EviD. 702: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id. See also
Kline v. Ford Motoi Co., Inc., 523 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1975) (expert testimony
admissible where jury can derive assistance from it); Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
516 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1975) (trial court's exclusion of expert testimony reversible
error where such testimony would have aided the jury).
" Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See
also United States v. Stifel 11, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (court found that scientific
evidence met test of admissibility as set forth in Frye), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
" FED. R. EVID. 702. These uniform rules did not become effective until July, 1975, ap-
proximately one and one half years after the Amaral decision. Id. See Kline, 523 F.2d at
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abandons the rigid Frye test in favor of a more relaxed standard
for determining the admissibility of expert testimony.58 If such
knowledge will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue,"" then a witness who has been
qualified as an expert by the court may testify in the form of an
opinion." Most federal courts currently apply this relaxed stan-
dard when determining whether expert testimony should be ad-
mitted 6 Finally, the probative value of the proffered testimony
must outweigh the potential prejudicial effect presented by the
testimony. 7 It is submitted that, in appropriate cases, expert testi-
mony relevant to the existence and characteristics of child sexual
abuse syndrome (syndrome evidence) satisfies the rigid test set
forth in United States v. Amaral."
The first obstacle to be overcome when dealing with the admis-
sibility of expert testimony involves qualifying a witness to testify
as an expert.' Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the qualifica-
tion of a witness as an expert "is a question which lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge."" She will determine the wit-
ness's ability "to draw inferences from facts which a jury would
1070. But see United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-59 (6th Cir. 1977) (no error to
reject evidence that did not meet the Frye standard).
" See FED. R. EVID. 702. Expert testimony is discussed in terms of "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge." Id.
4Id.
" Id.
" See Viterbo v. Dow Chemical, 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987). Sce also Lu Metta v.
United States Robotics, 824 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussion of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 with respect to expert testimony as to "reasonable finder's fees"); United
States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir. 1987) (application of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 to expert psychological testimony); Karns v. Emerson Elec., Co., 817 F.2d
1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (expert testimony inadmissible if it confuses or misleads the
jury).
" United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152. See FED. R. EvID. 403. "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. See also
United States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1983) (district court's determination
that the prejudicial effect of expert testimony outweighed its probative value held not to be
an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
" 488 F.2d at 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
69 Id. at 1153. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also Wells, supra note 22, at
675 (judge determines whether expert witness has ability to make inferences which jury
would not be able to make when deciding on witness's qualifications).
60 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 702[04] at 702-22.
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not be competent to draw.""1
Once the court has qualified a witness, it must then determine
whether the subject of inquiry lends itself to the use of expert
testimony."' In those jurisdictions that follow the Federal Rules of
Evidence, such testimony will be permitted where it provides assis-
tance to the trier of fact."' It is submitted that evidence as to
whether or not an alleged victim possesses characteristics similar
to those exhibited by actual victims of child sexual abuse is a
proper subject for expert testimony since the average juror is un-
familiar with the emotional and psychological factors which moti-
vate the child to subsequently act as she does."
"I E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 13 at 33. Factors affecting this determination include the
expert's level of education as well as her exposure to the particular field that is the subject
of inquiry through work-related activities. FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee note. The
advisory committee determined that "the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a
person qualified by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education'." See United
States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1346 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931 (1984). The court
determined that a witness was qualified to testify as an expert on the subject of shoe and
print analysis based upon the following factors: at the time of trial, the witness worked at a
crime laboratory as a fire arms and tool mark examiner; he earned an associate degree and
a bachelor's degree and, also at the time of trial, was working on a master's degree in
criminal justice administration; he had studied fire arm and tool mark identification; his
expertise in rcgard to shoeprint examinations was obtained through contact with associates
in the profession and from on-the-job training; he had previously performed shoe print
analysis on some thirty cases over a six-year period. Id. at 1345. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 702[04] at 702-22 (indicating a reluctance on the part of appel-
late courts to disturb a trial judge's finding with respect to the admissibility of expert
testimony).
It is submitted that case law demonstrates the availability of individuals suitable to offer
expert testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome. See, e.g., State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d
566, 575, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984) (witness qualified as an expert to testify to delayed
reporting patterns of child sexual abuse victims). See also State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604,
608-09 (Minn. 1984) (clinical psychologist who worked at a mental health center, held a
doctorate in psychology and had a caseload of sixty familial sexual abuse cases at the time
of trial was qualified by the court as an expert); Willaims v. State, No. 01-85-00960-CR slip
op. (Ct. App. Texas Sept. 11, 1986) (the court qualified a witness as an expert to testify to
the effect of sexual abuse upon children based upon the following factors: the expert wit-
ness had earned a bachelor of arts degree in psychology and sociology and a masters de-
gree in educational psychology; she had six years work experience with the State Depart-
ment of Human Services as a psychologist and case worker; she had investigated
approximately 200 incidents of child abuse and sexual molestation). Cf. State v. Marks, 231
Kan. 645, 653, 647 P.2d 1292, 1298-99 (1982) (board certified neurologist and psychiatrist
who practiced psychiatry and taught at an institution was qualified to testify as to rape
trauma syndrome).
2 Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152-53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
"s Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152-53. See FED. R. EvID. 702. See also supra note 56 and accom-
panying text.
See Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 610-11. "The cause of many physical and emotional ail-
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Numerous characteristics indicative of child sexual abuse have
been identified by experts."" Two traits which cause difficulty to
lay persons are delayed reporting patterns"6 and recantations.""
When the presence of these traits are revealed to jurors who are
unaware that these are typical responses of child sexual abuse vic-
tims, they might consider such inconsistencies as evidence that the
child is lying.U Allowing the expert to testify as to these matters
ments and even the existence of those conditions which are identified chiefly by subjective
complaints cannot be demonstrated to an absolute certainty; they are, nevertheless, the
subject of expert testimony." Id. See also United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th
Cir. 1986) (the court stated, in dicta, that expert testimony as to syndrome evidence may
assist the jury); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 473-74, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (1986) (allowed
expert testimony on behavioral characteristics of child molestation victims to assist jury in
"weighing the testimony of the alleged child victim"); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427,
436-37, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1983) (18 prospective jurors were questioned during voir
dire as to their personal familiarity with a child victim of sexual abuse; 15 responded that
they were unfamiliar with anyone suffering from such abuse; two reported having heard
stories; one juror was excused because of her knowledge of sexual abuse). Cf. Massaro,
supra note 46, at 442-43 ("expert testimony about RTS (rape trauma syndrome) can assist
in overcoming this tendency of jurors to blame and disbelieve the victim; it may reveal the
psychological trauma, suffered by a victim ... Jurors are not trained to identify trauma or
evaluate the extent of a victim's psychological injuries .....").
" See Notes, supra note 9, at 442. Symptoms often exhibited are depression, extreme
sexual curiosity, sexual aggression, sudden nightmares, bedwetting, crying, and fear. Id. at
442-43 n.94. Other characteristics which experts have identified are fatigue, weakness,
headaches, stomach aches, ringing in ears, concentration difficulties, allegations by siblings
of similar mistreatment. See Sloan, supra note 46, at 111-12.
See State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 570, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984). An expert
witness was permitted to testify that victims of child sexual abuse typically report abuse a
substantial period of time after its occurrence. Id. See also State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604,
610 (Minn. 1984) (a child sexual abuse victim will often delay in reporting an abuse due to
feelings of "confusion, shame, guilt, and fear"); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 435-36,
657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1983):
If the complaining witness in a burglary trial, after making the initial report, denied
several times before testifying at trial that the crime had happened, the jury would
have good reason to doubt seriously her credibility at any time. However, in this
instance we are concerned with a child who states she has been the victim of sexual
abuse ... It would be useful to the jury to know that not just this victim but many
child victims are ambivalent about the forcefulness with which they want to pursue
the complaint, and it is not uncommon for them to deny the act ever happened.
Id.
" See Middleton, 294 Or. at 429, 657 P.2d at 1216. A 14 year old daughter retracted
statements, made several months earlier, accusing her father of rape. See also People v.
Grady, 133 Misc. 2d 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1986) (syndrome evidence is admis-
sible to aid the jury in understanding "false recantations and feelings of guilt and appre-
hension about the trial").
" See Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d at 576, 683 P.2d at 180 (1984). There was no abuse of
discretion by the trial court when it allowed expert testimony that delayed reporting is not
unusual. See also Middleton, 294 Or. at 430, 657 P.2d at 1221 (1983) (testimony as to fre-
quency of inconsistent statements made by sexually abused child allowed).
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will enable the jury to better determine the credibility of the
child.69
Critics question the reliability70 of syndrome evidence. Their ar-
gument is that characteristics such as delayed reporting patterns,
recantations, and more general traits of anxiety, fear, and depres-
sion are not exclusively indicative of sexual abuse but rather may
be symptomatic of other stresses.71 It is submitted that the exis-
tence of more than one explanation for the development of these
manifestations does not render the evidence unreliable and there-
fore inadmissible .7  The proper method of revealing alternative
theories is through cross-examination,"7 not exclusion.
The third prong of the Amaral test refers to the application of
the Frye standard. 4 In Frye v. United States,"7 the court determined
that scientific evidence was admissible only if the theory upon
which the evidence was based had "gained general acceptance in
" See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984) (background information
helpful to jury to understand uncertain behavior of child); Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d at 510,
683 P.2d at 180 (1984) (expert's information likely to help jury understand the evidence).
Cf. Middleton, 294 Or. at 430, 657 P.2d at 1221 (1983) (testimony of an expert that would
assist the jury to decide if a rape had actually occurred may be admitted).
70 See, e.g., Slicker, supra note 9, at 12 (suggesting that social workers have a bias towards
believing everything a child says); Notes, supra note 9 (discussing the unreliability of expert
testimony on typical characteristics of child sexual abuse victims). See generally McCord,
supra note 9, at 34 ("framework for analyzing admissibility [applied to] expert testimony
diagnosing a complainant as a victim of sexual abuse").
" See Notes, supra note 9, at 441-43. See also Jorne, Treating Sexually Abused Children, I
THE ABUSED CHILD IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 285 (1980) (discussing symptoms
which could be attributed to situations other than those of sexual abuse). Cf People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 241 n.4, 681 P.2d 291, 294 n.4, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 453 n.4
(1984) (the court reviewed the literature referred to by the parties and determined that
symptoms of a "'rape trauma syndrome" were not "as universal as the witness' testimony
indicated"); Massaro, supra note 46, at 447 (recognizing that although "rape trauma syn-
drome symptoms" may be similar to symptoms of various "post-traumatic stress-disor-
deris]", they are not identical).
"' Cf Massaro, supra note 46, at 447 (where symptoms of rape trauma symdrome were
identical to those of other stress disorders, evidence of such would still assist the jury in
determining whether the victim had been raped).
" See FED R EVID. 705, advisory committee note. "If the objection is made that leaving
it to the cross-examiner to bring out the supporting data is essentially unfair, the answer is
that he is under no compulsion to bring out any facts or data except those unfavorable to
the opinion." Id. Cf. Massaro, supra note 46, at 441 ("proper cross-examination of an ex-
pert about a victim's RTS symptoms can elicit whether other explanations for the trauma
symptoms exist .. ").
7o See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973).
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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the particular field of study in which it belongs.""" Therefore, de-
spite a finding by the court that a witness is qualified to testify as
an expert to a subject which is proper for expert testimony, such
testimony may still be deemed inadmissible in jurisdictions that
apply the Frye standard if the theory to which the expert sub-
scribes is not generally accepted by that particular field of study. 77
It is submitted that the child sexual abuse syndrome theory satis-
fies the Frye standard of admissibility.
The idea that children are capable of detailing false complaints
of sexual abuse has been abandoned by today's psychiatric field. 78
Commentators,7 9 notably psychiatrists" and sociologists, 8' have
begun to place credence in childrens' complaints of sexual abuse.
The experts have found that the independent stories of these chil-
dren share common behavioral responses which are considered
characteristic of victims of sexual abuse." Such responses com-
"Id.
See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982). The Saldana court
refused to admit expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome because the syndrome "is not
the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has oc-
curred." Id. at 229. See also United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (Frye
test applicable to a detection and tracking system); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,
557 (6th Cir. 1977) (procedure for comparing human hair samples subject to Frye test);
Prewitt v. State, 460 So.2d 296. 302 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (Frye standard applied to hyp-
notically induced testimony); United States v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Super. 273, 284, 479
A.2d 258, 264 (1984) (hypnotism and narcoanalysis have not yet gained "general accept-
ance in the scientific community"); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292,
1299 (1982) (the basis of a psychiatric diagnosis must satisfy the Frye standard of
admissibility).7' See Sloan, supra note 46, at 88. Most states have eliminated corroboration of child
sexual abuse testimony. Id. See also McCord, supra note 9, at 38, 55 (generally accepted by
scientific community dealing with sexually abused children that false reports are rare).
79 See McCord, supra note 9, at 38, 55.
" See Sloan, supra note 46, at 88.
" See Slicker, supra note 9, at 12.
"' See Sloan, supra note 46, at 7. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 9, at 23. McCord has
compiled a list of typical common behavioral responses as:
for children under five - developmental regression, clinging to mother, recurring
night terrors; for school-age children- gain or loss of weight, drop in academic per-
formance, insomnia, depression, anxiety, fears, conversion, hysteria and running
away; for older adolescents - social isolation[,] delinquent behavior, depression, sepa-
ration from important males, suicide, and aggressive behavior towards the mother.
Id. See also Wells, supra note 22, at 674 (discussion of behavioral responses in context of
intrafamilial sexual abuse); Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177, 181 (1983) (list of elements comprising "child sexual abuse ac-
comodation syndrome"): Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sexual Abuse of Children: The Law As A
Therapeutic Tool For Families, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL FOR CHILDREN, LEGAL REPRE-
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prise the child sexual abuse syndrome.83 This evidence of general
acceptability of such characteristics among psychiatrists and soci-
ologists should satisfy the requirements established by Frye.
Assuming, arguendo, that a jurisdiction normally applying the
Frye standard 4 determines that this evidence of behavioral re-
sponses does not satisfy the standard, it is submitted that expert
testimony as to such behavioral responses should nevertheless be
admitted because of the unique nature of the evidence in
question.
Expert testimony as to characteristics typically demonstrated by
sexually abused children has been categorized as " 'novel' psycho-
logical evidence." 5 The application of the Frye standard to this
type of evidence is problematic" because it is unclear whether
psychological evidence can be properly classified as scientific.87
The Frye standard of admissibility is inappropriate if psychological
evidence cannot be properly characterized as scientific." Assum-
ing that the psychological evidence can be classified as scientific
and the Frye standard is applied, there still exists the problem of a
delay before the theory, scientific or otherwise, is generally ac-
SENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD 70, 81-82 (1979) (list of behavioral responses sug-
gesting high probability of sexual abuse).
" See Mele-Sernovitz, supra note 82; Summit, supra note 82; Wells, supra note 22, at
674-75.
'" See Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1228 n.233 (1980). See supra note 77 and accompa-
nying text.
11 See McCord, supra note 9, at 28-29. Experts in the field of child abuse have no accu-
rate manner of proving to a court that a child is a victim of abuse. Id. See generally Gianelli,
supra note 84, at 1198-1231 (general discussion of the Frye standard in practical
application).
" See McCord, supra note 9, at 27-30; See also Gianelli, supra note 84, at 1204-31 (discus-
sion of various difficulties encountered in applying the Frye standard, i.e. determining the
type of evidence which should be subjected to the test). Cf. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d
236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984) ("IT]he literature does not
even purport to claim that the syndrome is a scientifically reliable means of proving that a
rape occurred .... ).
87 See Gianelli, supra, note 84, at 1219; McCord, supra note 9, at 24. See, e.g., United
States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1986) (court of appeals reversed district
court's decision to exclude psychiatric testimony; the district court's decision was based, in
part, on a finding that " 'psychiatry is still in its infancy' " and therefore not yet generally
accepted in the medical field).
"' See McCord, supra note 9, at 24. See also McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 905-16 (1982) (suggesting approaches other
than the Frye standard); Note, Changing The Standard For The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 757 (1979) (discussion of relevancy approach).
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cepted."' During this interim period, jurors may be deprived of
evidence which would enable them to reach a more informed de-
cision.90 Finally, it may prove more difficult for psychological evi-
dence, as opposed to "objective, mechanical techniques,"'" to gain
general acceptance because of its subjective nature."9 It is sug-
gested that psychological evidence is unique because of its subjec-
tive nature and therefore requires a less rigid standard of admissi-
bility. It is further suggested that Federal Rule 702 should be
adopted as the new standard governing expert testimony in child
sexual abuse cases.
Under Federal Rule 702, admissibility depends upon whether
the expert's testimony will assist the jury in comprehending the
evidence.93 It is suggested that testimony which is relevant to a
determination of the issue, and reliable, satisfies this standard.
The Federal Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence" as
''evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence."" It is submitted that expert testimony as to child sexual
abuse syndrome is relevant as it affects the issue of whether the
child complainant was sexually abused. Furthermore, it is submit-
ted that such testimony is reliable because it is based on indepen-
dent accounts of child sexual abuse which share common behav-
ioral responses.' 5
Once a court has qualified the witness, approved the subject of
" See McCord, supra note 9, at 30. See also Giannelli, supra note 84, at 1223 (discussing
the problem with delay that exists before a theory is generally accepted); People v. Kelly,
17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) (the Supreme
Court explained that "Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to
the- unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific principles"); State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) ("rape trauma syndrome" has
acquired general acceptance). But see United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir.
1986) (psychiatry not a field of study which has acquired general acceptance).
" See supra notes 3 & 8. Not admitting such evidence contradicts the helpfulness stan-
dard set forth in the Federal Rules. FED. R. EVID. 702. Under this standard, expert testi-
mony is admissible even if the issue is within the ordinary, unaided comprehension of the
jury provided that it will be of assistance to the jury in deciding the case. Id.
' McCord, supra note 9, at 30.
rId.
"See FED. R. EviD. 702; supra note 61.
" FED. R. EvID. 401.
" See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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expert testimony, and acknowledged compliance with the appro-
priate standard, it must then engage in a balancing test." The
court will weigh the probative value of the evidence against the
potential prejudice to the defendant resulting from the admission
of such evidence.' If the probative value outweighs the prejudi-
cial effect, the evidence will be admitted." It is submitted that the
probative value of an expert's testimony as to the existence and
characteristics of child sexual abuse syndrome exceeds any preju-
dicial effect to a defendant and therefore should be admitted.
The probative value of this evidence has already been discussed
in the guise of relevancy and reliability. It is suggested that the
probative value is very strong. The potential danger which arises
from the use of expert testimony is that the jury will overempha-
size the importance of the testimony and accept it as an absolute
truth." However, expert testimony is to be given the same weight
as other evidence of sexual abuse: it may be accepted or rejected
by the jury."' In order to avoid this potential hazard, it is sug-
gested that the court administer to the jury limiting instructions.
B. Jury Instructions
Since it has been advocated that the expert be permitted to ex-
press an opinion as to the characteristics and factors involved in
child sexual abuse, it is very important that adequate instructions
are presented to the jury. 01 The purpose of the instructions
" FED. R. EvID. 403. This rule states the following: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
Id.
" Id. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). According to the Abel Court, "a
district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence
under the Federal Rules." Id. See also Cleveland v; Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734
F.2d 1157, 1163 (6th Cir.) ("the trial court is to be given 'very substantial discretion' in
balancing between 'probative value on the one hand' and 'unfair prejudice' on the other..
), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
See CLEARY, supra note 1, at 37; McCord, supra note 9, at 33. See also Gianelli, supra
note 84, at 1237 (scientific evidence has tendency to "mislead the jury").
o See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 431, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1983) (jury not
bound by expert testimony even if uncontradicted).
"' See I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 107[04] at 107-49 - 107-50. Accord-
ing to Judge Weinstein "IT]he court properly exercises its responsibility to guide the jurors
in their search for the truth if it confines its remarks on credibility to those areas where the
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should be to assist the jury'02 in considering the facts so that its
"findings are within the bounds of reason." 103 The instructions
should point out that the expert's testimony is not to be consid-
ered an absolute truth1° but as a piece of evidence which must be
weighed by the jury and which can be rejected if not believed.
The testimony of an expert will not invade the province of the
jury if the appropriate instructions are given. 0 A proper charge
directing the jury to use and weigh the expert's testimony like all
other evidence will result in such testimony not receiving "the
stamp of scientific legitimacy." 106
C. Court Appointed Experts
Expert testimony is essential in establishing the credibility of a
practical experience of the jurors may be an inadequate yardstick to measure the veracity
of a witness." Id. McCord states that "To most people the topic of child sexual abuse is
unfamiliar and mysterious. There is no reason to believe that most people would under-
stand what effects sexual abuse has on a child and how those effects might be detected."
McCord, supra note 9, at 34.
'" See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 107104] at 107-48. Weinstein in this
situation found:
Where the trial judge undertakes to spell out his view of the probative force of the
evidence, drawing the attention of the jury to that which he considers more impor-
tant and pointing out that which is extraneous, the jury becomes the beneficiary of
the insight and analysis of one who has presided over many trials and whose legal
experience and training has sharpened his ability to sort out the significant from the
meaningless, the relevant from the immaterial.
Id.
Jo Id. § 200[071 at 200-36.
'0 See PATTERN JURY INSTIUCTIoNS, CRIMINAL CASES, 5th Cir. § 8 at 20 (1978):
You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give it
such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that the opinion of an
expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if you
should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound, or
that the opinion is outweighed by other evidence, then you may disregard the opin-
ion entirely.
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir. 1978) (jury need not
accept testimony of expert), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979). See also PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CASES, 1 th Cir. § 7 at 20 (1985) ("[mlerely because an expert wit-
ness has expressed an opinion, however, does not mean that you must accept that opin-
ion"); 1 CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: NEW YORK § 7.113 at 280-81 (lst ed. 1983).
I" See People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 1087, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1984) (expert testimony "on rape trauma syndrome" is "no more inflammatory,
nor more intrusive into the province of the jury than other expert testimony, assuming
adequate and proper instructions are provided").
"I See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982) (quoting People v. Izzo, 90
Mich. App. 727, 730, 282 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1979)).
Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome
child's allegations of sexual abuse. However, a number of
problems commonly associated with the expert witness raise ques-
tions as to the value of the testimony in aiding the fact finder in
evaluation of the fact in issue. Among these are: (1) inability to
procure the assistance of an expert, either because the litigant
cannot afford one or locate one willing to testify;"' (2) improper
qualifications; 1 "1 (3) intentional dishonesty;1" (4) bias; 1 (5) confu-
sion in trying to reconcile conflicting opinion;"" and (6) delays in
the administration of justice.1 1 2
It is submitted that absent an agreement between the parties,
the court should appoint an expert 18 to testify in child sexual
abuse cases. The use of the court appointed expert will "restore
impartiality, eliminate venality, . . . and most importantly assist
• .. the jury to reach a meaningful decision. ''114
1"7 See Myers, "The Battle of the Experts:" A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical
Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV. 539, 557 (1965). Even if a litigant can afford to bring in highly
tauted experts, there is a reluctance on the part of many to take part in a battle of experts.
Id.
Jos M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 246 (198 1); Myers, supra
note 107, at 549.
10, Id. at 550.
1 Id. at 551. The bias of an expert is the problem most often cited in connection with
the rendering of expert testimony. Lawyers are traditionally expected to be advocates; but
experts, especially medical experts, are expected to remain neutral. Id. "A substantial num-
ber [of expert witnesses, though they may start out neutral,] become infected with bias
when called as witnesses in the conventional way." Id. See Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony
Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416 (1961). "Cast in the role as partisans, subjected to hostile cross-
examination, and paid by one side, they tend to color their testimony." Id. at 416.
"' See J. BROOKE, IN THE WAKE OF TRAUMA 460 (1957). The author finds that different
experts given the same set of circumstances but judging from different backgrounds of
experience may honestly and competently arrive at different conclusions. Id. See also Myers,
supra note 107, at 548 (different "schools of thought" exist on significant issues).
A jury may be helpless to decide which of two theories presented by competing experts is
correct. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 706101] at 706-7. Judge Weinstein
states that "lIlt is naive to expect the jury to be capable of assessing the validity of diamet-
rically opposed testimony." Id. Graham, supra note 108, at 246. Since the jury depends
upon the experts themselves to explain propositions with which they are dealing absent the
use of a court appointed expert there is no independent means of measuring the reliability
of experts. Id.
11 See Myers, supra note 107, at 559-60. There is a necessary connection between the
backlog of cases and the battle of the experts. Id.
M See id. at 589. Myers suggested that other approaches include the establishment of a
panel of outstanding specialists who would be available at the call of the court. Id. Needell,
Psychiatric Expert Witness. Proposals for Change, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 425, 435 (1980). The
author favors the establishment of a psychiatric jury: a jury composed solely of psychiatrists
who would decide all issues of psychiatric facts. Id.
1 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 706[07] at 706-7.
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In appointing an expert, it is suggested that Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules would provide courts with a workable guideline.115
It is flexible enough to overcome many of the criticisms"1 against
court appointed experts. Furthermore, it is submitted that these
criticisms do not withstand close scrutiny in the child sexual abuse
context. First, such an expert witness would not have allegiance to
either party; she would not be compelled to maintain a particular
view. Hence, she would be able to discuss dispassionately the theo-
ries that would explain the child's behavior, even if she subscribed
to a particular theory. Moreover, considering the gravity of the
matter, that is balancing the protection of the child versus the
rights of the accused, it is suggested that it is unlikely that the
court appointed expert will forsake objectivism in order to sup-
port the virtues of a favored theory. Finally, the judge can insure
that objectivity is maintained by informing the expert of her
proper role.1
118 See FED. R. EviD. 706(a). The authors of this article agree that Rule 706(a) provides
the proper procedure for expert testimony by a court appointed expert:
A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court in writ-
ing . .. [a] witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if
any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be
called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-
examination by each party, including a party calling the witness.
Id. See, e.g., Smith By And Through Smith v. Armontrout, 604 F. Supp. 840, 844 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (court appointed expert required to prepare and file with the court and parties a
written report describing his psychiatric examination and his findings).
11 See, 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, § 706[01] at 706-9 to 706-11. Gener-
ally, four arguments against court appointed experts have been advanced:
(1) [t]he expert deprives the parties of their constitutional right to trial by jury: (2)
court appointment of experts substitutes an inquisitory approach for the traditional
adversary system in which the responsibility for developing facts lies with the parties;
(3) [ilf there is more than one school of thought about the subject of the expert
testimony, or the subject involves theoretical approaches as well as factual material,
it is impossible to obtain a neutral expert; (4) lal court appointed expert, especially if
the funds for compensation are limited, may do only a 'kind of routine job' instead
of the job in depth that a party's expert would produce.
Id. See also Myers, supra note 107, at 577-89 (testimony on a theory which yields no certain
resolution; totally impartial expert is unattainable; subversion of the adversary system):
Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert - Some Comments Concerning Criminal
Responsibilty and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 99, 107 (1976)
(experts are neither impartial nor do they have any special expertise with respect to crimi-
nal matters).
' See FED. R. EviD. 706(a). An expert may be advised of her role by the court. Id. See
also FED. R. EviD. 702 (if expert's specialized knowledge will help the jury understand the
evidence, then a qualified expert may give his opinion): Note, The Doctor in Court: Impartial
Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 728, 734 (1967) ("Ithe arguments proposed against
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In addition, the court's appointment of an expert does not bar
parties from calling expert witnesses of their own selection.1 8
However, the presence of an independent expert, by exposing ad-
versary witnesses to criticism, would strongly encourage them to
take greater care in offering their testimony."1 '
III. CONCLUSION
It is a tragic fact that many children in America have been vic-
tims of sexual abuse. These incidents may not have been reported
until weeks or months after they occurred due to fear or confu-
sion experienced by the child victim. By this time, little physical
evidence remains. The only remnants of the abuse are the testi-
mony of the child and evidence of the child's psychological suffer-
ing. Such evidence is insufficient to provide the jury with a basis
for making an informed decision because average lay persons are
unaware of the elements of child sexual abuse syndrome. Expert
testimony will enlighten them as to the characteristics of child sex-
ual abuse. However, we must be concerned with the possibility
that admitting such testimony will infringe upon the rights of the
accused.
The approach suggested in this article, that the expert be per-
mitted to testify to the existence and characteristics of child sexual
abuse as well as to characteristics demonstrated by the alleged vic-
tim, while not being permitted to state her personal opinion as to
the credibility of the victim, protects the rights of both parties.
Elizabeth MacEwen & Peter Tamigi
the use of impartial .. .witnesses have not been persuasive .....
FED. R. EVID. 706(d).
See FED. R. EvID. 706, advisory committee note. The advisory committee felt that
"ITihe ever-present possibility that the judge may appoint an expert in a given case must
inevitably exert a sobering effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the person
utilizing his services (emphasis added). " Id.
